

**A Comparison of Women’s Rights Brought About by War and by More Peaceful Means
in the Mountainous Countries of the Middle East and Central Asia**

Robert F. Norton

Adjunct Professor of Psychology

Utah Valley University

Orem, Utah

Abstract

In response to the totalitarian threat of Nazism during World War II and Communism afterwards, many scholars came to believe that the spread of democracy was the best weapon against totalitarian ideologies; likewise, in the wake of 9/11 others have voiced the strong conviction that the spread of democracy is the best weapon against global terrorism. Many of the former Soviet Islamic Republics have attempted to establish more democratic freedoms and have created constitutions to guarantee, establish, and preserve such freedoms. However, after elections have been held, the minority parties claim election fraud and complain that the rights provided by the constitution are only on paper and do not exist in reality. One good index of the level to which such democratic freedoms have been obtained is the extent to which women=s rights are functioning. This paper examines such rights under Communism in the Soviet Republics of Central Asia and then again in the new fledgling democracies as these have been formed without a major war since the collapse of the Soviet Union in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Women’s rights are also examined as they existed in the totalitarian Islamic states of Iraq under Sadam Hussein and Afghanistan under the Taliban before 9/11. Then these rights are examined again after the collapse of these totalitarian regimes do to war as they created their constitutions and held their first elections. Which way of obtaining democracy is more effective?

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Today we stand at a great crossroads of opportunity to move forward with boldness and strength toward a new world of peace and freedom, where peoples of all nations who are willing to share the responsibilities of self-determination can be united in an atmosphere of freedom and cooperation. This is a great opportunity to be free from the bondage of tyranny and mistrust and secure in the belief that all men are created equal before God and are endowed by their creator with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Everyone wants to be happy and longs for the freedom to explore the opportunities of life to maximize their potential to find contentment and joy in every day living. Many people in many parts of the world find themselves in a situation where the bondage they have experienced in the past has been loosened somewhat and they are eager yet somewhat afraid to try new opportunities that they have never had before, but have only dreamed about. Many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia in particular find themselves at this time at a crossroads, having been bound for many centuries in a state of fear that has prevented them from realizing their potential. Since the bondage that has kept them from fighting one another for centuries has been relaxed, they now have a fresh opportunity to start anew and explore freedoms that have been denied them in the past. They have the chance to learn to live harmoniously with one another, conscious of the rights and desires that each one has, or the chance to strive to gain advantage over one another and to exploit each other as they have so long been exploited in the past. Sometimes it is dangerous to be given freedoms too quickly as we saw in Iraq after liberation from Saddam and his

tyranny and in New Orleans after many abandoned their homes to find safety from Katrina. When the restraints of law are no longer in force, we often forget the responsibilities that we owe to each other to respect the rights that each of us desires so that all can be happy, and we may often find ourselves being as tyrannical as those who controlled us in the past. Or, perhaps we have never known freedom enough to know the responsibility that it places on each of us to respect the rights and freedoms of one another if we are all to remain free.

Many people in various parts of the world find themselves under fewer restraints than in the past as in Central Asia and China, but each situation is different and requires different responses to be maximally beneficial. Likewise, Afghans, Pashtoons, Iraqis, Kurds, Shiites, Sunnites, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Syrians, Iranians, Saudis, Palestinians, and Israelis find themselves each in somewhat different circumstances with respect to freedoms and restraints. Yet all cannot help but wonder what life would be like with more freedoms than each currently has or has had in the past. In this paper and at this conference we are exploring how many of these groups of people are learning to live harmoniously with one another or are continuing to live in fear and unhappiness.

Both Iraq and Afghanistan find themselves in a unique situation with respect to democratization in that coalitions of outside forces have intervened to overthrow the autocracies that have held the people in these countries hostage in recent years and to give them an opportunity to chart a new course experimenting with the freedoms and opportunities of democracy. Iraq has a rich history and has in the past experienced great wealth, power, and influence. Today it is a mix of several different cultures or factions that have been forced by circumstances to live together in one country. The power structure has recently shifted, putting some that have been oppressed in positions of power, and putting others that have enjoyed the privilege of power and comfort in a situation of fear and uncertainty. Afghanistan, although it is more homogeneous than Iraq with respect to the tribes that live there, has never been able to overcome tribal differences successfully enough to be in control of their own country for more than a generation for over 3000 years. Both Iraq and Afghanistan now find themselves at a crossroads of opportunity which could be the beginning of a tremendous opportunity for happiness and success or a return for many of them to domination and unhappiness for generations to come.

First we will look at a quick analysis of the progress toward democratization as calculated by Freedom House of some of the major nations of Central Asia and the Middle East as well as some established democracies for comparison. The rankings are all less favorable than we would like and may reflect a particular bias of Freedom House. Their guidelines for calculating things like *ADemocracy Rank* and *APolitical Rights Score* are useful, but they are not transparent and are somewhat counter intuitive. The author is taking the liberty to convert all of Freedom House's scores to percentages of the highest possible score in each category to make the different categories more comparable and is making 100% the top score rather than 1 so that they will be easier to interpret. Using their system, the lower the score, the higher the level of democracy attained. Using this transformation, the higher the score, the higher the level of democracy. The transformed scores are in percentages so 90-100% is exceptional, 80-90% is good, and 70-80% is average. This characterization will be intuitively easier to interpret.

We ordered the scores using the Democracy Rank category as the most meaningful one for our evaluation. When we examine the scores in Table 1 (at the end of the paper), we find some unusual results that cause us to question many of the findings of Freedom House. The country with the highest level of democracy on all of the measures reported is Finland. Indeed all of the Scandinavian countries (not shown in the table) have values very close to Finland with values much higher than the countries that are generally recognized throughout the world as being outstanding

models of democracy: the United Kingdom, the United States, France, etc. This seems to indicate that the variables that Freedom House is measuring are correlated highly with characteristics associated with the Scandinavian countries, which may or may not be crucial to the establishment of a stable democracy. Another bit of information that seems to jump out at us when we look at Table 1 is that most of the emerging democracies in Central Asia and the Middle East are very low in their rankings in all of the measures of democracy compared with the established pillars of democracy that are at the top of the Table. This is disheartening when we look at the great efforts and sacrifices these countries are making to become viable democracies. Most of the countries of Central Asia and the Middle East rank in the bottom fourth in percentile rankings in all of the indicators of successful democracies (Freedom House, January 2004-February 18, 2007). Why is this so? And why are established countries that are not trying to democratize (North Korea, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan) ranked so much higher than these fledgling democracies? Why is North Korea ranked so high in the Democracy Ranking, when it is rock bottom in all of the other strong indicators of effective democracy? Why is Kyrgyzstan ranked highest among all of the fledgling democracies when it is probably the most unstable due to the 2005 revolution? Why are Afghanistan and Iraq so low when they have made so many significant efforts and sacrifices for democratization? The answer may be that the index of measurement is not effective. One of the worthy goals of this conference might be to come up with a more reliable measure of the effectiveness of new democracies.

If we examine a three-dimensional graphing of the data in Table 1 (at the end of the paper) another important and interesting fact emerges: Three of the variables are highly correlated and seem to be relatively stable. These variables are democracy rank, press freedom, and political rights. The variable that bounces all over the place is absence of corruption. Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Turkmenistan are relatively high in lack of corruption, but relatively low in all of the other indices of effective democracy. On the other hand, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Israel, Turkey, Afghanistan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Myanmar are relatively stable across all the indicators of democratization. The first six (those underlined) are relatively high in all indices of successful democratization; the latter six are relatively low in all indices of successful democratization. Two of the countries are relatively high in corruption (low in lack of corruption) and relatively high in the other indices of democratization: Kyrgyzstan and Iraq. One of the countries is relatively low in absence of corruption and low in political rights, but relatively high in the other two indices of successful democratization: Pakistan.

Human rights is another area where the quality of democracies can be evaluated. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz constitutions provide the following human rights and freedoms:

1. Freedom from arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life
2. Freedom from disappearance
3. Freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
4. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention
5. Freedom from denial of fair public trial
6. Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence
7. Freedom of speech and press
8. Freedom of peaceful assembly and association

9. Freedom of religion (An interesting note for this audience is that the largest recognized protestant church in Kyrgyzstan is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.)
10. Freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation
11. The right of citizens to change their government with universal suffrage for those over 18 years of age
12. Freedom from discrimination, societal abuses, and trafficking in personsBespecially for women and children (Prostitution is not prohibited by law; however, forced prostitution is illegal.)
13. The right for free and equal access to education by both boys and girls through age 16, or the 9th grade. (The law provides for access to public education for refugee or illegal migrant children.)
14. The right to free medical care for indigent children irrespective of gender.
15. The right to the following worker rights: (a) the right of association, (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively, (c) prohibition of forced or compulsory labor, (d) prohibition of child labor, and (e) acceptable conditions of work (U.S. Department of State, 2005).

Although the above wording is from the Kazakh constitution, most of the same basic rights and freedoms are provided by the Kyrgyz constitution as well. The problem arises because although these rights and freedoms are provided by most of the new constitutions in Central Asia and the Middle East, in point of fact many of them are usually denied, especially to minorities and women. That is probably the reason these countries rank so low in the actual attainment of democratization according to the Freedom House data.

What other variables might be better indices of the effectiveness of these fledgling democracies in establishing effective democracies? One category of variables, especially interesting to the people attending this conference, is women=s rights. Many of these new democracies have made amazing inroads in establishing rights for women where none existed before. Such women=s rights as the following would be good to examine in detail: voting responsibly, being elected, suing for divorce from their husbands, gaining custody of their children after divorce, working outside the home, participating in education, and being free from genital mutilation and from being trafficked as sex slaves. Probably the most meaningful of these as a strong indicator of the strength of democratization is the number of women elected to parliament. We will examine this in more detail shortly.

We have seen from the above look at the Kazakh constitution that many of these women=s rights are provided by the constitution to the women in Kazakhstan, as they likely are provided to the women of the other Islamic Republics of Central Asia by their respective constitutions. The problem arises in the implementation of these rights because the deeply entrenched tribal traditions have taken away many of the rights and freedoms that Muslim women enjoyed in the days of Mohammed and in the Golden Years of Islam from about 700 to 1300 A.D. During the Golden Years, freedom of religion was present throughout the Muslim world; women were not restricted by wearing the veil; and they worked hand in hand with men in running the affairs of daily life and commerce as they do in some of the more progressive Islamic nations of today, like Lebanon, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The Religion of Islam as it was practiced in the Golden Years was very compatible with the freedoms and rights of democracy, but some of the totalitarian traditions of the neighboring states that Islam expanded into curtailed some of these rights and freedoms especially for women. The more restrictive traditions and laws creep into the religion only as it is practiced by selfish despots that would force their interpretation of the Koran and the Hadith on the world to get gain for

themselves at the expense of the truly edifying and mind building spiritual truths taught by the Koran and the sayings of Mohammed (Mayfield, 2005).

We all have seen on the news as the people of Afghanistan and Iraq learned how to use the principles of democracy and the freedoms given to all mankind by the God of Abraham, Jesus and Mohammed as they exercised this God-given right to vote for the people that would lead their neighborhoods, cities, districts, provinces, and nations in applying the teachings of Mohammed and the other great prophets to live harmoniously with all of God=s children in peace and love as they did in the days of Mohammed and in the Golden Years of Islam. This is exemplified magnificently in the rights that women have been exercising in these two countries to vote for the candidates of their own choosing, to run for and to hold office in the new local and national offices of their own countries. We all watched on December 20th of 2005 as dozens of female deputies took their seats in the upper and lower houses of Afghanistan=s new parliament. Shukria Barkzai, one of 68 women elected to the lower house of Afghanistan=s new parliament, called it a *momentous day*.⁶ This is the first time since 1973 that Afghanistan has had its own parliament. She proclaimed, *The atmosphere was beautiful, very calm, full of emotions and love. I think even if our previous leaders once again attempt to divide people under the names of languages, regions, and clans, I am 100 percent sure that the current atmosphere in parliament will continue forever.*⁷ Twenty three women were appointed to the upper house, giving Afghani women a total of 91 seats in the newly created parliament out of 351 seats.

We saw a similar thing happen in Iraq on January 30, 2005, as over 8 million Iraqis went to the polls to elect a transitional assembly despite the threat of violence. This assembly had a number of women comparable to those elected in Afghanistan. Nine of these women worked on drafting the constitution as part of the 71 member team of Kurdish and Shia negotiators who drafted and approved the Iraqi constitution and presented it to the parliament on August 28, 2005 and then to the people for a vote of approval on October 15, 2005. Then on December 15, 2005 millions of Iraqi men and women turned out to vote for a full-term government under the provisions of the new constitution that they created. Turnout across the country was high. Sunni Arabs who boycotted the previous election in January 2005 participated in large numbers even in insurgent strongholds. The results were announced on January 21, 2006 with the Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance winning, but failing to obtain an absolute majority. The alliance took 128 of the 275 seat parliament, 10 short of an outright majority. Kurdish parties won 53 seats and the main Sunni Arab bloc won 44 seats. Of this 275 seat parliament, 70 were women. Since then the United Iraqi Alliance has formed a unity government under the leadership of Nouri Al-Malaki and the insurgency has mounted a strong effort to try to prevent the new government from succeeding.

Now let us examine the numbers of women elected to several of the newly-formed legislatures and some of the firmly-established legislatures throughout the world to get a feel for the strength of this variable as an indicator of the effectiveness of the democratization in these fledgling democracies. As we see from looking at Table 2 (at the end of the paper), both Afghanistan and Iraq have made substantial improvements in the numbers of women elected to parliament since the new elections after the toppling of the oppressive regimes of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein respectively. Afghanistan and Iraq both elected parliaments with more than a fourth of the seats going to women (25.9% and 25.5% respectively). These are significantly higher than the percentages elected in the well established democracies of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, with only 13.9%, 15.9%, and 19.8% respectively, and much higher than the world average of only about 12%. This is a remarkable gain from the 0.0% during the years in Afghanistan under the Taliban and the years in Iraq under Saddam Hussein when he abolished the gains during the 70's and 80's after the First Gulf War to remain in power. The number of women serving in the Iraqi

Parliament declined from 10.8% in 1989 to 0.0% shortly after the end of the first Gulf War when Saddam Hussein was driven out of Kuwait. One of the sources claimed that Iraq still had 11% women in parliament in 1994, but this was more likely a failure to consider the documented decline after the First Gulf War. This is a substantial improvement in women=s involvement in the government even above the gains in Iraq before and in the early reign of Saddam Hussein (Focus International, 2006; Reynolds, 1999; International IDEA and Stockholm University, 2006).

These gains in both Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2005 elections are considerably higher than the gains for the former Soviet Islamic Republics since 1994. However, both Tajikistan and Turkmenistan increased women=s representation in parliament substantially: Tajikistan going from only 3% in 1994 to 17.5% in 2005 and Turkmenistan going from 5% in 1994 to 16% in 2005. Furthermore, Turkmenistan also elected a woman, Akdja Nurberdyeva, unanimously as Chairwomen of the Medjlis (the Parliament in Turkmenistan). Ba feat it took the United States over 230 years to accomplish just this year with the election of Nancy Pelosi as Speaker of the House. Uzbekistan had a modest gain from 10% in 1994 to 16.4% in 2005, while both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan declined in women=s representation in parliament: Kyrgyzstan decreasing from 6% in 1994 to 0.0% by 2006 (2 women elected in 2005 lost their seats by court order) and Kazakhstan decreasing from 11% in 1994 to 9.5% in 2004.

Some other countries have also made impressive gains in women=s representation in their legislatures, notably Israel, Palestine, Morocco, and Pakistan. See Table 2. These countries should all be examined in greater detail to learn what has led to these impressive improvements.

Conclusions

The gains in democracy that have been the most impressive and dramatic by far are the gains in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and this is most significantly manifested in this paper at least by their gains in the representation of women in their legislatures. See Table 2 (at the end of the paper). Virtually all of the major goals with respect to voting in elections; drafting constitutions incorporating the freedoms, rights, and duties of democracy; and broadening the heterogeneity of their legislative branches of government by establishing quotas for including women have been efficiently accomplished. This seems to indicate that war is the most effective way for the democratization of a nation. Progress was made so much more rapidly likely because of the sacrifices and rapid changes that war makes possible, but significant progress has been made in some of the fledgling democracies of Central Asia as well—not as dramatic, but with less destruction and loss of life. Will the changes in Afghanistan and Iraq be long-lasting like those in the United States and the United Kingdom, or more fleeting like those in Russia? Often changes that come about too quickly can change again equally quickly for the better or for the worse. Only the hindsight of history will tell for certain.

There are strong indications that democratization could only have been accomplished in Iraq using war because the elaborate system of social control and patronage that was consolidated under Saddam Hussein, destroyed or suppressed the usual social and cultural relations that help social institutions to function smoothly and efficiently. Saddam=s five deep security and spying organization assured enforcement by creating interlocking networks of informers, rewarded for spying on family, friends, and neighbors, which further eroded the trust and camaraderie that normally contributes to community solidarity.

Based upon input from [the] Iraqi staff, it was postulated that the former Saddam Hussein regime had systematically destroyed the natural expectations that one could trust members of one=s tribe, one=s clan, or more broadly, one=s personal ethnic or religious groupings. The challenges that

the Iraqi people face reflect over three decades of internal brutality, imprisonment, and torture. The dominant expectations, reflecting most types of social interactions, were often based upon fear, insecurity, lack of trust, and a perpetual terror that Saddam=s network of informers would find them guilty of some infraction of the rules. It took great courage to confront this authoritarian system. Many of the natural leaders and courageous opponents to Saddam were either killed or forced to flee Iraq (Mayfield, 2005, p.19)@

Personal sacrifice seems to be an important factor in making lasting changes, but perhaps the sacrifice can be more psychological than physical in nature. The most essential aspect or nature of the sacrifices needed must be explored more deeply. Substantial changes were made in Pakistan, Morocco, Jordan, and Palestine as well, and these need to be studied and evaluated with equal or even greater scrutiny. Such an evaluation should shed light on other aspects that are also important in bringing about a lasting democracy.

Our tools for evaluating the success of democratization need to be honed and refined. The measuring tool created by Freedom House has long been used by the State Department in the United States and is popular in other circles as well, but it is not infallible: It can be improved. Freedom of the press, political rights, and absence of corruption need to be examined, but so do other human rights, women=s rights, and freedom of religion as well. The only women=s right we examined in detail in this paper was the right of women to be elected and to participate actively in the government. Even this right needs to be examined in greater depth, but we also need to examine the other women=s rights suggested in this paper as being important indicators of the success of democratization: voting responsibly, suing for divorce from their husbands, gaining custody of their children after divorce, working outside the home, participating in education, and being free from genital mutilation and from being trafficked as sex slaves. All of these are treated either directly or indirectly in great depth in the Koran, but all of these are completely ignored by radical Islamists who rob their own people of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Koran.

The extent to which these rights for women are addressed in the constitutions of new democracies and are implemented in practice, along with similar rights for minorities, may actually be more discriminating predictors of the success of democratization than the ones used by Freedom House, because they deal with fine points of the effectiveness of democracy, the rights that tradition has ignored—the rights that truly make democracy superior to all other forms of government.

One more thing needs to be mentioned when addressing the most effective ways of bringing about successful democratization to people that have not grown up using the principles and procedures of democracy. Democracy as it should be practiced is a sophisticated form of governance. It requires a much higher level of cognitive and moral ability than most forms of governance. Lawrence Kohlberg believes it requires the ability to reason abstractly (formal operational thinking, Piaget=s highest stage) and post-conventional morality (at least at Kohlberg=s fifth stage of development). This means that to be maximally effective, the citizens of any democracy must understand the principles and procedures of democracy and must value the rights and freedoms of everyone living within their community. Otherwise important aspects of a happy, productive life will be overlooked and many living within the community will be both unhappy and unfulfilled. Therefore, people that have not grown up exercising the principles and procedures of democracy need to be trained or educated in the most effective way to use these principles. Such a program was implemented effectively in Iraq and may be the main reason that women were so strongly represented in the first national assembly created by the Iraqi voters and elected officials.

Iraq has made remarkable progress in establishing governing councils at the neighborhood, city, district, provincial, and federal levels and has established its first full term unity government

with its prime minister selected by a coalition of delegates from enough political parties to achieve a majority in the parliament. This Iraq has done following the procedures of a constitution which it has created and approved through the efforts of its own duly elected constitutional assembly. This is a tremendous accomplishment in light of the turmoil created in two of the provinces by an insurgency that is bent on preventing this fledgling democracy from succeeding.

The effectiveness of the training plan for teaching at the grass roots level the principles of democracy and their compatibility with Islam that was utilized in Iraq has clearly demonstrated the feasibility of using a similar plan in helping the fledgling democracies throughout the Middle East and Central Asia to gain the confidence they need to implement the subtleties of democracy while adapting them to the unique conditions in which they alone find themselves. This implementation, at the neighborhood level first, has created a confidence and a motivation strong enough to overcome the difficulties created by an insurgency which attempts to use old methods to return the country to domination by tyrants. Such a training plan may be the only one strong enough to create the seeds of cooperation which are necessary to enable former enemies to work together to create a system of governance in which all can achieve major goals. This may be the level of sacrifice, short of war, that may be necessary for democracy to succeed and flourish. (See the author=s paper entitled *ADemocratization and Combating Global Terrorism: A Look at the Bush Plan for the Democratization and Reconstruction of Iraq* (Norton, 2006) and James B. Mayfield=s book entitled *The Enigma of Iraq* (Mayfield, 2005) for more details about the training program.)

The Tables and Figure in this paper have provided details and raised many questions that have not been elaborated or answered in this paper. It is the hope of the author that those who read this paper will ponder the details and questions most relevant to their own areas of research and expertise and will use it as a catalyst to create a greater understanding of the critical attributes of successful democratization training. This will help to enable countries all over the world who admire the freedoms and happiness made possible by democracy to implement it in their own nations to meet their unique needs. This will ultimately be the strongest deterrent against global terrorism and will move us all forward in the goal of achieving a truly cooperative world.

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Table 1: Adjusted Freedom House Data on the Levels of Democratization

Nation	Democracy Rank	Press Freedom	Corruption Absence	Political Rights
Finland	99.3	99.3	99.3	85.7
United Kingdom	94	88	90.9	85.7
United States	90	93	88.1	85.7
France	89	82.7	90.9	85.7
Israel	79	76	81.4	85.7
Turkey	63	54.7	65.5	57.1
North Korea	44.7	0.0	*	*
Kuwait	42	46	75.2	42.9
Jordan	42	38.7	78.6	28.6
Lebanon	37	39.3	63.4	28.6
Egypt	35	38.7	60.7	14.3
Morocco	33	38.7	54.5	28.6
Pakistan	26	38.7	14.5	14.3
Kyrgyzstan	25	33.3	14.5	28.6
Afghanistan	22.7	22.7	27.6	28.6
Saudi Arabia	21	13.3	60.7	0.0
Russia	20	20.7	27.7	14.3
Azerbaijan	18	19.3	22.1	14.3
Kazakhstan	18	16.7	33.8	14.3
Iraq	13	21.3	1.4	14.3
Tajikistan	11	15.3	14.5	14.3
Syria	10	8	46.2	0.0
Iran	8	8	37.9	14.3
Somalia	5	10	7.6	0.0
Libya	2	2.7	37.9	0.0
Uzbekistan	2	4.7	7.6	0.0
Turkmenistan	.7	2.7	14.5	0.0
Myanmar	0.0	2.7	1.4	0.0
Palestine	*	*	*	*

*Unavailable

Table 2: Percentages of Women Elected to Parliaments or Legislatures in Established Democracies, in Arab or Middle Eastern Nations, and in New Democracies in Central Asia for the 1980's, 1994, and 2003-2006

	<u>1980's</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>2003-6</u>	<u>Lower House</u>	<u>Upper House</u>
Sweden			47.3		
United States			15.9	16.3	14.0
United Kingdom			19.8		
France			13.9	12.1	16.9
Israel		9.0	14.2		
Palestine			12.9		
Afghanistan		0.0	25.9	27.3	22.5
Egypt			2.2		
Iraq	10.8	11 or 0	25.5		
Jordan		1.0	7.3	5.5	10.9
Kuwait		2.0			
Lebanon		2.0	4.7		
Morocco			10.8		
Pakistan		2.0	20.4	21.3	17.0
Qatar		0.0			
Saudi Arabia		0.0			
Syria		8.0			
Turkey		2.0			
U. Arab Emirates		0.0			
Kyrgyzstan		6.0	2.7 or 0		
Kazakhstan		11.0	9.5	10.4	7.7
Tajikistan		3.0	17.5		
Uzbekistan		10.0	16.4	17.5	15.0
Turkmenistan		5.0	16.0		

Figure 1: Levels of Democratization

Levels of Democratization

